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PATENT EXPLOITATION AND MODERN ANTITRUST
LAW: A SPECIAL CASE FOR MERGER ANALYSIS
Barry E. Adler*
INTRODUCTION
The licensing of patents and the marketing of patented products run afoul,
at times, of the antitrust laws. Exploitation of a patent has characteristics
similar to the exploitation of monopoly power. The courts have established
a rather odd set of rules to limit patent exploitation. The United States
Supreme Court, in particular, has applied various, sometimes contradictory,
rationales in its rulings. Part I of this article describes some of the Supreme
Court case law in this area and offers an alternative economic analysis of
patent exploitation. It concludes that the Court, in general, has treated
the marketing of patented products and processes too harshly, and, as a
result, has lost sight of the purposes of antitrust law in this area.
In 1979, the Supreme Court held in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,I that
the marketing of blanket licenses for the performance of copyrighted music
was not a violation of the antitrust laws. Part II of this article describes
how Broadcast Music, though not a patent case, should alter the way the
antitrust laws limit patent exploitation. The Court's rationale in Broadcast
Music requires courts to take a hard look at a patentee's conduct before
allowing the antitrust laws to bite. A patentee's marketing activities, although
analogous to monopolistic exploitation, are important production-enhancing
elements in the fragile process of creating intellectual property; a process
that Congress has specifically sanctioned. Building on the current Justice
Department Merger Guidelines, Part III proposes a framework for this "hard
look."
I. PATENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
A. Background
A patent is a property interest in information. Our founding fathers
recognized the need for such an interest when they vested in Congress the
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power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." ' 2 Congress has exercised this power by providing
that "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . ."I A patent grants "to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years ...the right
to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention .... 4
Patents are necessary to provide incentives to inventors. Innovation is
expensive. Moreover, many creative endeavors end without positive result.
No one knows with any degree of certainty that a desired invention can
actually be created; nor does one know for sure that an invention will be
useful even if one succeeds in creating it. Thus, few will pursue innovation
absent the knowledge that a useful invention will provide rewards for the
inventor.
Patent laws provide such rewards. The legal system gives an inventor
enforceable exclusive rights to a new invention. Innovation is as easy to
copy as it is difficult to create. If there were no legal constraints, an inventor's
ideas could be exploited with no resulting benefit to the inventor. Merely
copying another's idea normally requires no great expenditure of physical
or mental resources. Analogous is a magician's illusion. One is baffled until
the trick is explained; then the solution appears obvious. One who copies
an inventor's idea can compete against the inventor for the invention's
rewards.
Legal protection solves this free rider problem; exclusive rights to a useful
invention are valuable. Assume, for example, that an inventor discovers a
patentable method to manufacture television sets for half the existing cost
of production. The inventor may enter the television manufacturing market
and undersell the competition, or the inventor may license the patent to
an existing manufacturer. The manufacturer will be able to increase its
profits if this license is exclusive. Thus, if the inventor can restrict use of
the invention, the manufacturer will be willing to pay the inventor for
the inventor's rights. It is this ability to market an exclusive right that gives
the inventor additional incentive to invent.
Thus far we have seen why Congress enacted patent protection. There are,
however, still unanswered questions. Why is patent protection limited to
seventeen years? How can patents run afoul of the antitrust laws? The
answers to these questions are related. Briefly, patents create something
analogous to monopoly power. There is an economic rent to the exclusive
2. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
3. The Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 798 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
There are, of course, limitations on the right of a creator to patent a "process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof ...... A
detailed explanation of these limitations is beyond the scope of this article. Current codification
of the patent laws is found at 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-188 (1982).




interest in intellectual property. That is, a patentee or the patentee's licensee
can charge more for the last unit of the product than that unit cost to
produce. Presumably, patents are limited to seventeen years because Congress
has found that time period sufficient to provide incentives to innovate. A
shorter period might result in too little innovation. On the other hand, any
longer period might create an undesirable loss to the economy because a
patent holder would continue to charge more than marginal cost for products,
thus inefficiently inflating price and reducing quantity sold. This inefficiency,
called dead weight loss, is also the target of antitrust law. Thus, many actions
by a patentee to exploit a patent are subject to antitrust scrutiny.
Before a discussion of the antitrust laws that regulate patent use, consider
the source and the nature of a patentee's rent, and the accompanying dead
weight loss. Rents devolve upon a patentee either because the patentee holds
the rights to a unique product or because the patentee holds the rights to a
unique cost-saving device used in the manufacture of an existing product.
Assume the patentee has invented a unique product; for example, an auto-
mobile engine that will run one hundred miles per gallon of gas. The relevant
economic data for that engine may be as described by Illustration 1:
$ 1
Illustration 11
5. D is the demand curve for the engines; MC is the marginal cost of producing the
engines; MR is the marginal revenue to the patentee or licensee in selling the engines. These
symbols will be used throughout this article.
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The patentee, or the patentee's licensee, will sell Q. engines at a price of
P. At this combination the patentee will earn an economic profit of an
amount illustrated by rectangle I. Given the existence of the invention, the
optimal price and quantity for society as a whole are P0 , Q0. Only at this
combination is society expending resources equivalent to the maximum value
those resources could produce. The shaded triangle represents society's dead
weight loss-the value of the engines that the manufacturer optimally would
have produced, but did not.6
If the patentee loses exclusive rights to the engine design, the market will
eliminate dead weight loss. Assuming that anyone may use the design at no
cost, Q. engines will sell at P.. If the patentee attempts to sell engines at
above P., which equals marginal cost, other manufacturers with presumably
similar production capacities will step in and offer the engines for P.,
undercutting the patentee's price. Thus, the marginal cost curve defines the
price of P., and it is in the patentee's or anyone's interest to provide
engines at that price until the market reaches equilibrium at Qo.
Now assume that a patentee has invented a unique cost-saving device used
in the manufacture of an existing product. Perhaps the patentee has designed
a method by which conventional piston engines can be produced at half the
existing cost of production. Before the innovation, the relevant economic






The market would clear at P., Qo.
6. This analysis assumes that the patentee or licensee cannot price discriminate. See infra
text accompanying notes 32 & 33.
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Enter the cost-saving device:
$ 1
PO -MC (no innovation)
P1  -




The market would clear at P', Q .
Price has decreased and quantity has increased as compared to a world
with no patented innovation. There is, of course, a net economic gain to
society, as compared with the preexisting situation. The patentee, however,
will earn an economic profit illustrated by rectangle 1. The patent laws thus
create the setting for dead weight loss. The shaded triangle represents society's
lost opportunity to use resources to their maximum potential. For the same
reasons discussed above regarding Illustration 1, price and quantity would
move to P,, Q2, but for the exclusive right to the patented invention.
It is clear, however, that the dead weight loss described in these illustrations
is not necessarily inefficient or anti-competitive. The economic rents and
corresponding "loss" in each case exist only given the existence of the
innovation in question. As we have seen, the innovation exists because
the inventor foresaw some return on investment in the act of inventing.
The prospect of economic rents, sometimes mislabeled "monopoly profits,"
7. MR is the marginal revenue curve that a single market monopolist would face. Because
the demand curve for the patentee or his licensee is coincident with MC (no innovation) until
it crosses and follows the industry demand curve, the patentee's or licensee's marginal revenue
curve is coincident with MC (no innovation) until it crosses the industry demand curve, is there
1986]
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is the very incentive that produces the invention. Without the economic
rents in Illustration 1, there would be no dead weight loss, but neither
would there be a new efficient engine. Similarly, absent economic rents
in Illustration 3, there would be no dead weight loss, but neither would
there be a new efficient method of production. The dead weight loss
then becomes a cost to society only when the exclusive use granted to
the patentee provides incentives in excess of what is necessary to encourage
investment in any given innovation.' The expected profits, if sufficient
to compensate an inventor for the effort of inventing, encourage innova-
tion. And, as we have seen, once an innovation exists, society better
uses its resources. Unrestrained by a patentee's exclusive rights, society
would put these resources to even better use. Thus, if a patentee can,
unencumbered, extend or expand a patent's power, rewards not justified
by efficiency considerations may accrue to the patentee.'
In principle the antitrust laws operate to prevent the unencumbered. ex-
pansion of a patentee's power. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that
"every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal."' 1 Section 2
of that Act provides that "every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of . . . trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed
guilty of a felony . . . ."" Thus, if a patentee either enters into contracts
with others in order to exploit the patent-i.e., a patentee licenses the
discontinuous and, in circumstances not here illustrated, could result in a market that clears at the
same price and quantity that would obtain without the innovation. For the sake of simplicity,
however, MR is assumed to be the marginal revenue curve for the patentee or his licensee. P,
and Q2 are the price and quantity respectively at which the patentee or his licensee will sell.
The two MC curves represent the marginal cost for the patentee or his licensee, and the marginal
cost for industry as a whole, absent the innovation.
8. The process alluded to in the text is far more complex than meets the eye. Dead weight
loss, discussed in the text, and the loss most frequently discussed in literature, is not the only
possible loss from excessive patent protection. See, e.g., Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploi-
tation of the Patent Monopoly, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966):
[Mionopoly over [an] invention decreases the incentives of innovators other than
the initial patentee to engage in further research within the field covered by the
monopoly. For any improvement discovered will be subservient to the initial patent
and useless in the hands of anyone but the initial patent holder; and in dealing
with the initial patent holder the subsequent inventor will occupy a weak bargaining
position since he faces a monopsonistic buyer. The extent of the dampening effect
increases as the legal life of the initial monopoly is made longer.
Id. at 270. Nor are dead weight loss and dampening of future innovation the only costs of
patent protection, "but reference to them is sufficient to make the point that [a patent, analogous
to a] monopoly device . . .is capable of diverting too many resources to innovation and that
the question of how much monopoly subsidy to confer is a difficult one." Id. at 271. See
also Kaplow, The Patent Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HAsv. L. REv. 1815, 1816-45
(1984). An analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that the
optimal patent protection cannot be precisely measured.
9. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 443-44
(2d ed. 1980).
10. The Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
11. Id. § 2.
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exclusive rights in a new engine to an engine manufacturer-or attempts to
use an invention to "corner the market," his activities may be subject to
antitrust scrutiny. Exploiting a patent, either unilaterally or with others, is
thus analogous to the exploitation of monopoly power. 12
Of course, patent protection and its benefits would vanish if every attempt
to exploit a patent were considered an antitrust violation. The law does not
go this far. 3 We now turn to the rather odd set of rules established by
judicial decisions in the area of patent exploitation.
B. Case Analysis
It is useful, at this point, to examine a few of the Supreme Court's
decisions that illustrate the treatment of patent licensing arrangements under
the antitrust laws.
1. Exploiting a Patent to Its Limits; In General
Brulotte v. Thys Co.," though not an antitrust case, is a good starting
point. A patent licensing agreement provided royalties for the use of machines
beyond the expiration of the last patent for components incorporated in the
machines. The Supreme Court held that the royalty provision was unlawful.
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate
with the leverage of that monopoly.
But to use that leverage to protect those royalty payments beyond the life
of the patent is ... an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent ....
The exaction of royalties for use of a machine after the patent has expired
is an assertion of monopoly power in the post expiration period when...
the patent has entered the public domain.'"
Brulotte has carried over into formal antitrust analysis. In Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,16 licensee Zenith brought a Sherman Act
claim against patentee Hazeltine, alleging that Hazeltine had unlawfully
attempted to extend its patents by insisting on acceptance of its package
license agreement and by reserving royalties on the licensee's total sales,
regardless of whether Zenith actually used the licensed patents in the
products manufactured. Relying on Brulotte, the Court held that a patentee
12. In addition to the Sherman Act provisions cited in the text, § 3 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982), inter alia, explicitly prohibits a patentee from tying the licensing of his
patent to the licensee's agreement not to deal with the patentee's competitors. Such activity is
considered an illegitimate extension of a patent. For a more detailed discussion of tie-ins, see
infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
13. The Supreme Court has broadly defined a patentee's right exclusively to exploit his
patent, a right that includes the ability to enter into exclusive licensing arrangements. See
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). In Dawson, the Court,
relying on § 271(c) and § 271(d) of the Patent Act of 1952, upheld the right of the holder of
a patented method of applying an herbicidal to refuse to license its process to a competing
manufacturer of the herbicide used in the process. Dawson, however, is not an antitrust case.
14. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
15. Id. at 33.
16. 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
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may not "use the power of his patent to insist on total sales royalty and to
override protestations of the licensee that some of his products are unsuited
to the patent or that for some lines of his merchandise he has no need or
desire to purchase the privileges of the patent."'' 7
In both Brulotte and Zenith, the Court was concerned that, absent restraint,
a patentee would extort from a licensee a profit in excess of the profit
Congress granted in extending patent protection. These cases reflect the
concern that excess patentee power will cause a licensee to make purchases
that, but for coercion, the licensee would not make, thus creating a misal-
location of resources beyond that necessary to provide incentives for inno-
vation. This concern was misplaced. The Court in Brulotte accepted that "a
patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate
with the leverage of that monopoly."' 8 What the Court failed to realize in
both Brulotte and Zenith is that the patentee in each case could do no more
than exploit the patent law's seventeen-year exclusive rights. A purchaser
will not pay more for something than its worth. This is true whether the
purchase is of a security, an automobile or a license. Payments spread out
over time, or based on a percentage of license sales, can, therefore, best
be explained by legitimate creative financing arrangements, not by mono-
poly profit extraction.
To illustrate, let us use a hypothetical that includes all the seemingly
objectionable features in Brulotte and Zenith. Assume that an engine man-
ufacturer wishes to license the rights to a design for a gas-saving automobile
engine. Assume also that the patentee will license the design only if the
manufacturer will pay a flat-rate royalty on every automobile that the
manufacturer sells for the next twenty-five years, whether or not the man-
ufacturer uses the patentee's engine. Moreover, to create an extreme example,
assume that the patentee includes in the royalty a charge for the rights to a
printing process, the use of which the manufacturer values not at all. Will
the manufacturer purchase this package that includes the rights to the
valuable gas-saving engine? The answer, of course, depends in large part on
the price of the package. The manufacturer would estimate the increase in
sales and profits from cars over the next twenty-five years attributable to
the license and would use this estimate to calculate the present value of the
license. Taking the total number of cars to be sold times amount of the
entire royalty and discounting to present value provides the present cost of
the license. In comparing present value to present costs, if the costs exceeded
the benefit, the manufacturer would reject the deal.
It is hard to see, therefore, how a patentee could extract from a licensee
more than the patent's value. The patentee will attempt fully to exploit the
patent by finding the most efficient licensees-those valuing most, and thus
most willing to pay for, the license. The patentee will also attempt to extract
from licensees the full value of the patent to the licensees. There are any
17. Id. at 139.
18. 379 U.S. at 33.
[Vol. 35:825
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number of ways a patentee may accomplish this, but none of these will
allow the patentee to earn more for a patent than the patent is worth. No
rational actor will pay something for nothing, nor will one pay twice for
the same thing. Thus, at least according to the Court's stated rationale,
Brulotte and Zenith were wrongly decided.1 9
Other cases, however, do implicitly recognize the inherent power of the
marketplace to limit a patentee's power. In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
Co.,20 the parties entered into a contract in which Aronson, in return for a
royalty of five percent of the selling price, granted Quick Point the exclusive
right to make and sell a keyholder designed by Aronson for which a patent
application was pending. If the patent was not allowed within five years,
the royalty was to be reduced to two and one-half percent of sales. The
patent was disallowed, and Quick Point tried to escape its contractual
obligation to pay Aronson two and one-half percent on the unpatented item.
The Court upheld the contract and noted that the parties themselves were
best able to determine the prospective value of a pending patent application:
No doubt a pending patent application gives the applicant some additional
bargaining power for purposes of negotiating a royalty agreement. The
pending application allows the inventor to hold out the hope of an exclusive
right to exploit the idea, as well as the threat that the other party will be
prevented from using the idea for 17 years. However, the amount of
leverage arising from a patent application depends on how likely the parties
consider it to be that a valid patent will issue. 2'
Similarly, Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 22 allowed an arrangement by which a licensee paid a flat per unit royalty
for a license whether or not the units of output included a patented input.
In that case, Automatic Radio acquired a license to use all Hazeltine patents
by promising to pay a percentage royalty based on the selling price of
Automatic's radio receivers. Hazeltine sued for the royalty payments. Auto-
matic alleged patent misuse since the agreement extracted royalties whether
or not any of the patents were used in Automatic's radio receivers. The
Court upheld the agreement as a convenient method designed by the parties
to avoid determining whether each radio receiver embodied a Hazeltine
patent. The percentage royalty was an acceptable alternative to a lump sum
payment for the privilege to use the patents. 23 The Court was not concerned
that Hazeltine might extort from Automatic payments beyond the value of
the patents that Automatic actually used.
It seems obvious that the rationale of Automatic Radio and Aronson
19. See W. BowMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW, A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL
89-92 (1973); R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER
MATERIALS 815-16 (2d ed. 1981). But see Baxter, supra note 8.
20. 440 U.S. 257 (1978).
21. Id. at 265.
22. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
23. Id. at 834. The Court also invoked licensee estoppel, a rule that "the licensee under a
patent license agreement may not challenge the validity of the licensed patent in a suit for
royalties due under the contract." Id. at 836 (citation omitted). That this is no longer the
general rule was stated by the Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969).
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applies equally well to Brulotte and to Zenith. Nevertheless, the fear of
private extortion of a licensee remains part of the law. An attempt to
reconcile Zenith with Automatic Radio reveals why this may be so.
2. Tie-ins
Zenith, a 1978 case, came twenty-eight years after Automatic Radio and
distinguished it. The Zenith Court noted:
[W]e do not read Automatic Radio to authorize the patentee to use the
power of his patent to insist on a total-sales royalty and to override
protestations of the licensee that some of his products are unsuited to the
patent or that for some lines of his merchandise he has no need or desire
to purchase the privileges of the patent. In such event, not only would
royalties be collected on unpatented merchandise, but the obligation to
pay for nonuse would clearly have its source in the leverage of the patent. 24
The Court's emphasis on "protestation of the licensee" indicates that the
Court was worried about a tie-in. According to the Court, it seems the
licensee in Zenith could have bought the package or nothing at all, while
the licensee in Automatic Radio could have negotiated for any combination
of patent terms, but chose to purchase a package of which it later tried to
rid itself. In the Court's view, in Zenith, but not in Automatic Radio, the
items in the package were tied together. 21
The antitrust laws treat patent tie-ins as an unlawful extension of an
otherwise valid exclusive right. Perhaps the most important case regarding
patent tie-ins is International Salt Co. v. United States.26 International Salt
owned patents on two machines for utilization of salt products. The principal
method of distribution for each of these machines was under leases that
required the lessee to purchase from the patentee all the salt consumed in
the leased machines. Salt, of course, is not patented. The Court found that
these leases foreclosed salt sales competition between International Salt and
its competitors, and held that it is unlawful per se to foreclose competitors
from a market.2 7
Why did the Court give tie-ins such harsh treatment? The "foreclosure"
line of reasoning indicates that the Court was worried about a patentee
parlaying a patent in one market into a monopoly in another. According to
this theory, a licensee values salt machines; thus, the licensee will promise
to buy salt from a patentee, even at an inflated price, just to be able to use
the valuable machine. The patentee then will have the power to raise the
price of salt above market price. The patentee could earn monopoly profits
at the cost to society of foreclosed competition and inefficiently low pro-
duction.
We have already seen why this will not occur. Recall the discussion of
24. 395 U.S. at 139.
25. Id. at 137.
26. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
27. The Court found a violation of § I of the Sherman Act as well as a violation of § 3
of the Clayton Act. Id. at 396. For an explanation of the latter provision, see supra note 12.
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Brulotte and Zenith.2 No licensee will pay more for a license than the license
is worth to the licensee. Conversely, the patentee may not need to accept
less than the same value. Thus, even without attaching strings, the patentee
could, under some circumstances, charge the licensee the value of the license
to the licensee. And no matter what strings attach, the patentee can charge
no more. To illustrate, if International Salt charged an exploitative price for
salt to be used with its machines, it would have to reduce by an exactly
offsetting amount the price it could otherwise charge for the use of the
machines. Licensees are interested in the utility of salt; neither salt itself nor
the machines have independent value. International Salt, then, has no interest
in monopolizing the salt market through its patent. Indeed, International
Salt would wish to have the most efficient salt producer sell to its machine
licensee at the lowest possible price. Cheap salt makes the processing less
costly overall. As salt becomes less expensive, the licensed machine becomes
more valuable.
One might ask why patentees tie other products to the sale or license of
their patents. One explanation offered by International Salt is that the patentee
may wish to guarantee that products used with the patented item are of high
quality. In International Salt, the company claimed that it feared that another
company's bad salt would damage the patented machines' performances. The
consumer, it argued, would be unable to tell whether the machine or the salt
was faulty. Demand for the machines might fall. International Salt argued that
it could guarantee good machine performance only by supplying its own good
salt. The Court did not reject this argument in theory, it simply did not believe
the company's claim. The Court noted that International Salt could have
achieved quality control by regulating the quality of the salt that a licensee
could purchase from other salt producers. 29
Another explanation is analogous to the one relied upon in Automatic
Radio. Packaging products might be the most convenient way to sell them.
For example, a shirt manufacturer is unlikely to have any ulterior motive
when tying buttons. It would be too expensive to produce a line of buttonless
shirts for the few people who would buy them and then sew on their own
buttons. Similarly, a machine patent holder might wish to produce a patented
machine and integrate unpatented component parts. In sum, it might be more
efficient to sell packages and only packages. Despite the per se rule set out in
International Salt, today there is little doubt that a patentee who can dem-
onstrate such integration lawfully will be able to market the packaged inven-
tion.30
28. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
29. 332 U.S. at 397-98. Note that the Court's very consideration of this quality control
argument belies the case's per se rule. Nevertheless, at least nominally, International Salt's per
se rule remains law. Cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), which
accepts the per se rule, but dilutes it to the extent that a party must first have market power
before a tying arrangement can be adjudged invalid.
30. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). See also paragraphs
(c) & (d) of 35 U.S.C. § 271, which, taken together, permit a patentee to tie use of his patent
to the sale of "a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition,
1986]
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The International Salt holding is not, however, completely illogical. The
foregoing discussion indicates that a patentee cannot use a patent to earn
profits in excess of the value of a patented product or process to a licensee.
Behind this conclusion, however, it is evident that a patentee can use tie-ins
to earn profits, not in excess of the patent's value, but in excess of the profits
available absent the tie-ins. In essence, although a patentee can never obtain
from a licensee more than the patent's worth, a patentee may be able to "extort"
a portion of that worth normally captured in consumer surplus. To illustrate,
assume International Salt entered a competitive market to sell licenses for its
patented salt machines. Given that the machines have no perfect substitutes,
International Salt would face a downward sloping demand curve that might
be as described by Illustration 4:
0 Qi Qm
Illustration 431
or a material or apparatus for use ... [provided such] is not a staple article or commodity
... suitable for substantial noninfringing use." 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982). Accord Dawson
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). For a discussion of Dawson, see supra
note 13.
31. The marginal cost of marketing any number of licenses for an existing patent may well
be approximately zero. This is not important for this illustration, however.
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Assume that International Salt grants licenses at a single price, Pro Shaded
triangle I represents licensee consumer surplus. Consider the ith license sold.
The licensee who purchased that license was willing to pay a higher price,
e.g., Pi, representing the value of the license to that licensee. Because the
license is available at the lower price, this licensee has benefited in an amount
equal to Pi-Pm. This is that licensee's consumer surplus. Shaded triangle I is
the sum of Pi-Pm for all purchasers who would have been willing to pay
more than Pm for the license. Now, what would happen if International Salt
somehow knew the value of its license to each putative purchaser? The first
and most obvious effect would be that the company would charge each
purchaser the value of the license to that purchaser. There would be no one
market clearing price; each purchaser would pay its Pi. Consumer surplus would
disappear. International Salt would convert the area in triangle I from con-
sumer surplus to additional profit. It may be difficult and costly, however,
for International Salt to determine each purchaser's imputed evaluation. A
tie-in may aid in this process.
Remember, a licensee values salt use, not salt or salt machines separately.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that a licensee using a great deal of salt
highly values a cost-saving machine. Such a licensee presumably will get more
productive use out of the machine than will a licensee who uses less salt. This
observation creates an opportunity for price discrimination. International Salt
could sell its licenses at a low price on the condition that the licensees purchase
salt only from International Salt. The company could then charge an above-
market price for salt that licensees will be willing to pay because the license
package includes a break on using the machines. The effective price to each
licensee of machine use will vary according to that licensee's salt use, but will
never exceed the value of the machine license to the licensee (once again, no
licensee would pay more for a package than the package is worth to that
licensee). International Salt can use salt purchases to meter the value of its
patent to each licensee, discriminating in the price for machine use by charging
each licensee the full value of the use that the licensee makes of the machine. 32
That tie-ins can facilitate price discrimination does not, however, necessarily
mean that tie-ins are anti-competitive and deserving of prohibition. As we
have seen, despite discrimination, the patentee cannot extend patent-created
power to earn profits beyond the value that the patent creates for the economy.
On the other hand, allowing price discrimination might produce incentives
beyond those necessary to induce the invention in the first place. This dilemma
is the one we addressed in Part I(A) of this article regarding optimal patent
protection. Here, as there, it is difficult to determine what is sufficient
32. For further analysis of International Salt, see Peterman, The International Salt Case, 22
J.L. & ECON. 351 (1979). See also IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (another
case arguably involving tie-in metered price discrimination; IBM's leases of tabulating machines
conditioned on use only of IBM's own cards held violation of Clayton Act).
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protection. Here, however, one wonders if added incentive to a patentee is
harmful to the economy whether or not there is an overincentive. It is quite
likely that a monopolist's or an exclusive producer's price discrimination is
beneficial. Let us look again at International Salt's license market, but this
time we will assume that the company can tie salt sales to its licenses so that





R .*w/out price discrimination)
Illustration 5
A price-discriminating producer such as International Salt will not set asingle price at Pm as it would if there were no price discrimination. Such a
producer can charge a lower price for lower demand customers and not lose
the opportunity to charge more to higher demand customers. Thus Interna-
tional Salt's marginal revenue curve coincides with the demand curve. Although
the patentee now captures the consumer surplus in trapezoid II in addition to
that in triangle I, dead wieght loss is also eliminated, resulting in more efficient
use of resources. This efficient allocation is not inexorable. For example, the
monopolist might not be able to estimate demand accurately and might
inadvertently reduce output. Nevertheless, even if there is no resultant benefit
PA TENT LICENSING
to society, it would be unwise to expend resources punishing tie-ins under the
antitrust laws. Such expenditure certainly seems unwise where patent tie-ins
of complementing inputs provide relatively accurate information that can form
the basis for useful price discrimination.33
3. Business Combination
Business combinations between patentees and licensees represent a third
and, as we shall see, an important category of cases in which the Court has
prohibited patent exploitation.
a. Vertical Arrangements
While a patentee is subject to antitrust scrutiny when a license to a separate
business entity includes restrictive clauses, case law indicates that not all
such contracts are combinations that violate the antitrust laws. In E. Bement
& Sons v. National Harrow Co.,34 the Supreme Court held that it was not
unlawful for a patentee and licensee contractually to fix the price that the
licensee must charge for the products manufactured using the patent. Re-
ferring to Bement in a later case, the Court stated that the Sherman Act
"clearly does not refer to that kind of a restraint of interstate commerce
which may arise from reasonable and legal conditions imposed upon the
assignee or licensee of a patent by the owner thereof, restricting the terms
upon which the article may be used and the price to be demanded therefor." ' ,
This conclusion is correct.3 6 Once an inventor has achieved a patent, there
will be either direct or indirect costs in exploiting that patent. Assume an
inventor has discovered a new gas-saving engine. Post-invention, the intel-
lectual property component of engine production has a zero marginal cost.
Physical production, however, has a positive marginal cost in a market that
might be as described by Illustration 6:
33. Note that no defense of tie-ins can make lawful those tie-ins subject to explicit prohibition
by the Clayton Act. See supra note 12. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements for the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957) (discussion of tie-ins as method of price discrimination);
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 308 (1981)
(general discussion of possible advantages in monopolist price discrimination); see also Telser,
A Theory of Monopoly of Complementary Goods, 52 J. Bus. 211 (1979) (tie-in may be means
of price discrimination if complementary commodities are sold in different proportions to
different customers).
34. 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
35. Id. at 92. Accord Standard Sanitary Mfg. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 40 (1912).
36. The conclusion alone is correct. The Court seems to have completely mischaracterized
the facts in Bement. See Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON.
309, 330-32 (1977) (arguing that scheme involved in Bement was in fact restraint of trade).
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Illustration 6
The inventor would like to maximize profits by selling Q, engines at a
price of P per engine. But assume that the inventor is a high-brow type who
knows not the first thing about organizing an engine factory. The inventor,
therefore, will license the invention to an engine manufacturer. The royalty
price should be P.-P.." At this price the patentee will be able to capture
the economic rents that serve as a reward for ingenuity. It is clear that this
licensing scheme will not maximize the licensor's profits unless there is a
maximum price clause, or something with like effect, in the license agreement.
Assume that such a clause is absent, and the market from the manufacturer's
perspective may be as described by Illustration 7:
37. This assumes that marginal cost includes a full, non-economic return on the labor and
capital used in the physical production process. This is so for reasons that, if not obvious, are







The manufacturer is now the exclusive user and will seek rents in excess
of the patentee's. Thus Q, engines will sell for a price of P2. This is at a
higher price and a lower quantity than would prevail with the price restraint
and creates additional dead-weight loss. Moreover, the patentee is now worse
off because total royalty payments will be those represented by rectangle I,
as compared to the royalty payments (represented by the sum of rectangles
I and II) received under a system of price restraint. Thus, although the fear
of cut-off may chill a licensee from charging too much, the easily monitored
and enforced fixed maximum price may be the best way to ensure efficient
exploitation of a patent.3"
38. One might think it obvious that maximum price restraint is lawful under the antitrust
laws. As logical as this is, the law is to the contrary. Maximum price restraits are unlawful
just as minimum price restraints are unlawful. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968) (both maximum and mimimum price restraints per se violations of Sherman Act). See
also Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (minimum
price restraints unlawful).
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Consideration of minimum price restraint does not change the result.
Assume the same engine design patentee finds it convenient and efficient to
license to a number of competing manufacturers. Assume the competing
manufacturers put the engine in cars and sell the cars to the public. To sell
each car, each manufacturer would engage in costly explanation and dem-
onstration designed to convince the consumer that the cars with the new
engines are worth their selling price. Absent minimum price restraint, one
manufacturer might ride free on another's sales pitch. Manufacturer One
might observe Manufacturer Two spending time and money touting the new
engine. Manufacturer One might then sell its cars, with the same engine, for
a price less than Manufacturer Two's price; the price reduction could be
equal to the cost of Manufacturer Two's sales effort. Rational consumers
will listen to Manfacturer Two and buy from Manufacturer One. Rational
manufacturers in Manfacturer Two's position will stop providing the sales
information. This free riding will injure the economy generally as well as
the patentee. Consumers will be deprived of the efficient provision of
sales information about the new engine. The patentee will lose royalties
because the licensees will sell fewer cars that contain the engine. 9 Prohibiting
minimum price restraints might cause inefficiencies in addition to the one
described.4 We need not discuss these here. Suffice it to say that there are
situations in which it is efficient to allow a patentee and a licensee to set
ultimate product prices.
Once we realize that patentee/licensee price agreements can be efficient,
it follows that the antitrust laws should not prohibit such agreements when
they are free from other anti-competitive infirmity. We are willing to allow
patentees themselves to market their patented products and in doing so to
set prices that exploit the patent to its fullest extent. The foregoing discussion
demonstrates that price-fixing allows the patentee to achieve full exploitation.
Nothing in this discussion, however, indicates that a patentee can use licensee
price agreements to enhance a patent's rents at the expense of economic
efficiency. We have already seen why. If a patentee who is fully exploiting
a patent attempts to raise the price of a license or of a licensee's final
product, a profit-reducing decline in sales will follow.4 1 Despite the logic of
this position, permissible price restraint is not the law for all patent license
arrangements. Eleven years after Bement, the Court held in Bauer v.
O'Donnel42 that a patentee could not restrict a licensed article's resale price.
39. The Supreme Court has recognized this free rider problem. Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). "Because of market imperfections such as the so-
called 'free rider' effect . . . services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive
situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services
than if none did." Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
For a further discussion, see Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984).
40. See Priest, supra note 36, at 318-19.
41. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (discussion of Brulotte and Zenith). See
also Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 145-52.
42. 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
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Returning to Illustration 6, this means that the patentee and manufacturer-
licensee could not dictate retail prices to an independent automobile retail
distributor. This is absurd. As Justice McKenna noted in dissent in Bauer,
there is no plausible distinction between price maintenance and resale price
maintenance in terms of permissibility in patent licensing agreements. Each
sets the prices that the ultimate consumer will pay.4 1
Bauer is an old case. Time and logic notwithstanding, however, resale
price maintenance remains unlawful under the antitrust laws in both patent
licensing and other settings.4 A patentee is thus foreclosed from using an
efficient form of distribution. Moreover, a patentee may not even take
advantage of Bement's primary price maintenance if the licensees are or were
competitors. In United States v. Masonite Corp.,45 for example, Masonite
held a patent to produce hardboard. Masonite sold hardboard directly to
consumers and also licensed other building material suppliers to sell the
product. These other suppliers were designated as agents; Masonite fixed the
price and term of sales through the agents, some of whom had a competing
patent but did not use it. Each agent sold Masonite hardboard and received
a commission according to the terms of the agency license. The Court held
that the license arrangement was a combination in violation of Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act:
The power of Masonite to fix the price of the product which it manufac-
tures, and which the entire group sells with respect to which all have been
and are now actual or potential competitors, is a powerful inducement to
abandon competition. The extent to which that inducement in a given case
will have or has had the desired effect is difficult, if not impossible, of
measurement. The forces which that influence puts to work are subtle and
incalculable. Active and vigorous competition then tends to be impaired,
not from any preference of the public for the patented product, but from
the preference of the competitors for a mutual arrangement for price-
fixing which promises more profit if the parties abandon rather than
maintain competition.46
The Court got this one wrong. Masonite did not form a cartel with its
agents. Rather, Masonite used the power inherent in its hardboard patent
to turn the competitors into distributors. Studies of the market indicate that
the agents' royalties were quite small.47 It is true that Masonite did not
compete with its agents. But the small royalties make it clear that the agents
did not benefit from the reduction in competition as they would have
benefited were they cartel members. Masonite built a better mouse trap, and
43. Justice McKenna's Bauer dissent does not appear in the official report of the case. For
his views, see W. BowmtAN, supra note 19, at 150.
44. The Court's language was, "Retail price maintenance is not only designed to, but almost
invariably does in fact reduce price competition not only among sellers of the affected product,
but quite as much between that product and competing brands." Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 268 (1968)).
45. 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
46. Id. at 281.
47. See Priest, supra note 36, at 350-55.
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the agents beat a path to its door. Masonite used the agency agreements
and price-setting scheme merely to exploit its patent fully and effectively.
Masonite's competitors were in the best position to distribute hardboard.
The alternative was for Masonite alone to distribute its own product, possibly
forcing its former competitors out of business.
The Court did not reject these pro-competitive arguments as incorrect.
Rather, it considered them to be irrelevant:
Since there was price fixing, the fact that there were business reasons
which made the arrangements desirable . . . , the fact that the effect of
the combination may have been to increase the distribution of hardboard,
without increase of price to the consumer, or even to promote competition
between dealers [is not] legal justification for price-fixing."'"
In sum, the Court confused product pricing with cartel price-fixing and,
as a result, lost sight of antitrust law's purposes. This faulty analysis in the
Masonite case of cartel formation raises the issue of patent licensing as a
cartel facilitation practice.
. Horizontal Arrangements
Perhaps the most famous case of an alleged patent cross-licensing cartel
is Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States. 9 Before 1910, gasoline had
been manufactured from crude oil exclusively by distillation. As the demand
for gasoline grew, innovators discovered ways to "crack" crude oil, and
thereby produce more gas than distillation could produce. Cracking involved
applying heat and pressure to the residuum after ordinary distillation. No
fundamental patent controlled the process of cracking. Patents on various
aspects or alternatives of the process competed in the market. Beginning in
1920, conflict developed among four oil companies that were competing patent
holders; the disputes concerned the validity, scope, and ownership of issued
patents. The companies settled their disputes by, in essence, pooling the
patents; each company received a fixed proportion of the proceeds from a
pool of profits that a prearranged royalty schedule provided. All patents
were cross-licensed among competitors within the pool. The Justice Depart-
ment invoked the Sherman Act to challenge this cross-licensing arrangement.
The Department characterized the dispute settlement as a cartel to fix gasoline
prices. The Supreme Court disagreed:
If combining patent owners effectively dominate an industry, the power
to fix and maintain royalties is tantamount to the power to fix prices
.... [Wlhere domination exists, a pooling of competing process patents,
or an exchange of licenses for the purpose of curtailing the manufacture
and supply of an unpatented product is beyond the privileges conferred
by the patents and constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act .... But
an agreement for cross-licensing and division of royalties violates the Act
only when used to effect a monopoly, or to fix prices, or to impose
otherwise an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce .... We must,
therefore, examine the evidence to ascertain the operation and effect of
48. 316 U.S. at 276.
49. 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
[Vol. 35:825
PA TENT LICENSING
the challenged contracts .... No monopoly, or restriction of competition,
in the production of either ordinary or cracked gasoline has been proved.
The output of cracked gasoline in the years in question was about 26 per
cent of the total gasoline production. Ordinary or straight run gasoline is
indistinguishable from cracked gasoline and the two are either mixed or
sold interchangeably. Under these circumstances the primary defendants
could not effectively control the supply or fix the price of cracked gasoline
by virtue of their alleged monopoly of the cracking processes, unless they
could control, through some means, the remainder of the total gasoline
production from all sources. Proof of such control is lacking."
It is encouraging to see the Court applying economic analysis in its
decision. It is unfortunate, however, that the Court did not thoroughly
analyze the problem. If the defendants together monopolized the cracking
process, they might have been able to fix the prices and curtail the supply
of gasoline notwithstanding their lack of domination in the gasoline market.5
Assume that competing cracking patents create the same cost curves for the






50. Id. at 174-77. George Priest suggests that the cracking patents in issue covered virtually
one hundred percent of the gasoline market. Priest, supra note 36, at 369-71. For the purposes
of discussion in the text, however, we will assume the facts were as the Court saw them.
51. Professor William Landes first explained this possibility.
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Absent the combination among cracking patent holders, the gas market
would clear at P., Q., with Q-Qd gallons produced by cracking and Qd
gallons produced by distilling. If any of the cracking competitors attempted
to raise its price above P., another of the competitors would undercut that
competitor, picking up sales and returning the market to equilibrium at Po,
Q0. But now assume that the cracking patent holders have cartelized,
combining interests. The combination's market, based on the residual de-









52. The residual demand curve consists of the difference between D and MC (distilling) in
Illustration 8. That difference is zero at Pi.
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The cartel will sell Qc gallons of gas at Pc. The entire gasoline market
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Illustration 10
The market will now clear at P,, Q,. This represents a higher price and a
lower quantity than P0, Q.. Thus the cracking cartel could be effectively
anti-competitive even without its control over the distilling process. Moreover,
the new market clearing equilibrium contains inefficiencies that go beyond
increased price and diminished quantity. If only Q, gallons are produced,
cracking should supply Q,-Q3 gallons. In fact, the cartel cracks QI-Q2 gallons."
Distilling supplies Q2 gallons, Q2-Q, of which cracking could have produced
more efficiently." There is a misallocation of production resources.
Although the Standard Oil Court failed to recognize these problems, the
Court's conclusion may have been correct nevertheless. The foregoing ana-
53. Q1-Q 2 gallons in Illustration 10 equals Q, gallons in Illustration 9.
54. Note, however, that this misallocation will not occur if the distilling supply curve rises
solely because of increasing input costs. See infra text accompanying note 114.
B I I
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lysis suffers from the now familiar fallacy of post hoc rationalization. If the
competing cracking inventions were expensive to discover, competition among
them could result in negative returns for each inventor. Ex ante each inventor
might not have invested time and resources absent the expectation that a
discovery would at least share with comparable discoveries the fruits of
innovation. On the other hand, sanctioning the combination of competing
patents may provide an unnecessary incentive to innovation. This possibility
will be discussed in Parts II and III of this article."
In United States v. Line Material Co., 5 6 the Court erred in a different
direction than in Standard Oil. In Line Material, the Court struck down a
patent cross-licensing agreement between competitors solely because the
agreement involved price restrictions between competitors. The challenged
arrangements centered around three product patents that were useful in
protecting an electric circuit from the dangers incident to a short circuit or
other overload. Defendant Line Material Company held a patent that was
useful only in conjunction with the technology made possible by a patent
held by defendant Southern States Equipment Corporation. The defendants,
therefore, entered into a bilateral, royalty-free, cross-license agreement that,
inter alia, fixed the price of products manufactured using the patents. The
Court recognized that the patents were most useful when used together, but
held that:
[Wjhen patentees join in an agreement as here to maintain prices on their
several products, that agreement, however advantageous it may be to
stimulate the broader use of patents, is unlawful per se under the Sherman
Act. It is more than an exploitation of patents. There is the vice that
patentees have combined to fix prices on patented products."
The Line Materials Court attempted to distinguish Standard Oil by stating
that "where an arrangement by which the patentees pooled their oil cracking
patents and divided among themselves royalties from licensees fixed by the
pooling contracts was upheld, the theory was reiterated that a price limitation
for the product was unlawful per se."' " This distinction, seemingly between
royalty price and retail price, is disingenuous. In Standard Oil the defendants
pooled their cracking patents through a cross-licensing arrangement that
included a complex royalty schedule. The licensees and sublicensees subject
to this schedule may not have been explicitly subject to price restraint, but
the royalties served to impose a minimum price upon the licensees, if not
directly, at least through their sublicensees. The Standard Oil Court recog-
nized this in its conclusion that "If combining patent owners effectively
dominate an industry, the power to fix and maintain royalties is tantamount
55. This is precisely the dilemma that one faces when one attempts to decide what is the
optimal patent life. See supra text accompanying notes 2-13.
56. 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
57. Id. at 314-15. Note that the Court found, but did not rely upon, the fact that the
patents together dominated the market for circuit protection devices.
58. Id. at 313.
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to the power to fix prices."" The Standard Oil agreements were lawful not
because they did not fix prices, but because, in the Court's view, they did
not restrain trade.
Line Material might have been decided differently if the Court had adhered
to Standard Oil and had examined the agreements at issue under a restraint
of trade standard instead of imposing per se invalidity. Remember that the
Court found one patent in Line Material "blocked" the other; that is, the
second patent was not useful without the first. To illustrate, assume that,





The market would clear at P0, Q0.
Now assume that the Line Material innovations exist, but are not used
together. Only the first innovation will affect the market because the second
innovation is blocked by the first. The market would look like as described
by Illustration 12:6'
59. 283 U.S. at 174.
60. The contours of this graph are not empirically necessary. The same could be said for
Illustration 13, infra. No implicit assumption in these illustrations detracts in any way from
the conclusions in the text, however, see supra note 7.
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The market will clear at P,, Q.
Innovation One's patentee will earn the economic rent that rectangle I
represents.
Now allow the combination of Innovations One and Two, and assume
that the patentees of these innovations completely combine their interests.
The market would look as described by Illustration 13:
[Vol. 35:825
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Illustration 13
The market would clear at P2, Q. The patentees' combined rents would
increase to the amount that rectangle I represents, but the combination is
unambiguously beneficial. The combination is unambiguously beneficial be-
cause Q2 is greater than Q, and P2 is less than P,.1' Compare Standard
Oil, analyzed in Illustration 9 and the surrounding text. There, combining
the existing cracking patents effected an increase in gasoline price and a
61. Note that this analysis assumes completely complementary patents, described in the text
as "blocking." In general, complementary patents may at the same time enhance one another
and substitute for one another. Imagine patented photo chemicals that together bring out the
brightest pictures possible, and that even individually offer great improvements over alternative
chemicals. Combining these patents would not be unambiguously beneficial. On the one hand,
the chemicals are most effectively used together. On the other, uncombined, the chemicals
might compete with one another, driving price down and production up. The latter effect is
the same one described with regard to competitive patents. See infra text accompanying note
61. Thus, we see that patents can be complementary and competitive at the same time. (Much
thanks to William Landes for the idea behind this footnote.)
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decline in gasoline output. We noted that the laws should, perhaps, allow
such a combination anyway, because absent the combination and its eco-
nomic rents there may be too little incentive for future inventors who, ex
ante, might be similarly situated to the cracking patent inventors. In the
Line Material illustration, we face no similar weighing of foregone current
benefits against possible disincentive effects. In Line Material, even given
the existing patents, allowing combination and its monopoly effects is pref-
erable to disallowing the combination.
One might ask why a price restraint or other interest-combining agreement
between patentees must be allowed in order to achieve this beneficial patent
use. The answer is simple. Without the restraint inherent in Illustration 13,
the patentees would have little interest in licensing their patents to each
other. The patentees are locked into a bilateral monopoly. Together the
patents are worth more than the summed value of each separately. 62 The
patentees will agree on a division of interest in the combined patents, but
that agreement must contain a provision that protects the value of the
combination. George Priest describes the process as follows:
[Slince ... cross-licensing makes each [patentee] a competitor of the other,
the two must agree to restrain sales to avoid competing away the patent
rents. Without a price restraint, either could charge a smaller ... rent for
its own patent and cut the price or royalty for the combination to increase
relative sales. A price restriction or division of royalties would be necessary
to forestall competing away the . . . rents for each firm's own patent. Yet
for cross-licenses of this nature, the price restriction or division of royalties
allows each firm to garner no greater than legitimate returns for its
innovation and is no index of horizontal restraint. 63
This analysis has some support in the case law. Prior to Line Material,
the Court had recognized a patentee's need to use price restraint or a similar
arrangement fully to exploit a patent. In United States v. General Electric
Co.,64 General Electric owned patents that entirely controlled the manufac-
ture, use, and sale of tungsten incandescent lamps. General Electric's license
agreement with Westinghouse, its largest competitor, allowed General Elec-
tric to fix the price of lamps sold under the license. The Court held that a
patentee could assign markets for, or fix prices of, a patented product,
"provided the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably adapted to
secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly. ' 6
The Court in Line Material distinguished General Electric, characterizing
the latter's holding as a proposition that absent "a conspiracy to restrain
trade or an effort to monopolize . . . a patentee may license another to
62. It is true that, in this hypothetical based on Line Material, the second patent is blocked
by the first, and not vice-versa. This does not eliminate the second patentee's power. By reaching
an agreement with the second patentee, the first patentee can capture some of the second
patent's value. In order to induce the second patentee to enter the agreement, the first patentee
must allow the second patentee to retain some of the second patent's value.
63. Priest, supra note 36, at 357.
64. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
65. Id. at 490.
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make and vend the patented device with a provision that the licensee's sale
price shall be fixed by the patentee." 66 The Court believed that unlike Line
Material, General Electric involved no effort to restrain trade or monopolize.
This "distinction" is astonishingly unpersuasive. The question at issue in
both General Electric and Line Material was precisely whether an agreement
on price in a licensing agreement itself is a conspiracy to restrain trade or
an effort to monopolize. Both cases included price restriction agreements.
Both cases involved agreements between competitors-though the General
Electric Court somehow ignored the fact that Westinghouse was a competitor.
One difference between the cases is that Line Material involved cross-licenses,
while General Electric involved only a direct license. This difference, how-
ever, logically is not an important one. Indeed, as seen in Masonite, a
patentee may violate the law by granting a competitor a one-way restrictive
license. Yet the Court invokes a per se rule in Line Material at the same
time it claims to uphold its decision in General Electric. These cases do not
appear reconcilable.
In sum, the Court's unwillingness to explore fully the economics of patent
exploitation explains the confusion illustrated by contrasting General Electric
and Standard Oil with Line Material and Masonite. This confusion in the
law of horizontal licensing is similar to that which we have seen throughout
this article. Is there a way out of the quagmire? It appears so. And it lies
in a case that does not involve patents.
II. BROADCAST MUSIC AND THE RULE OF REASON APPLIED TO
PATENT EXPLOITATION
A. The Broadcast Music Case
The Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 67 changed the direction of antitrust law. The case
involved associations of music copyright holders. Since 1897, the copyright
laws have vested in the owner of a copyrighted musical composition the
exclusive right to perform the work publicly for profit.61 In 1914, a group
of composers organized the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP). Those who performed copyrighted music for profit
were so numerous and widespread, and most performances so fleeting, that
as a practical matter it was impossible for the many individual copyright
owners to negotiate with and license the users and to detect unauthorized
uses. ASCAP was organized as a "clearing house" for copyright owners
and users to solve these problems associated with the licensing of music. 69
66. 333 U.S. at 304.
67. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
68. Id. at 4 (citing Copyright Act of Jan. 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 481; see current version at 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (result of 1976 revision of copyright laws).
69. 441 U.S. at 5.
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At the time of Broadcast Music, ASCAP had 22,000 members, each of
whom granted it nonexclusive rights to license performances of their works.
ASCAP issued licenses and distributed royalties to copyright owners with a
schedule reflecting, inter alia, the nature and amount of the use of their
music. Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) was a similar organization and operated
in a similar fashion. ASCAP and BMI together had in their repertories
almost every composition copyrighted under United States law.
Litigation arose because both ASCAP and BMI operated primarily through
blanket licenses that gave licensees the right to perform any and all of the
compositions owned by members or affiliates for a stated term as often as
the licensees desired. Fees for blanket licenses were ordinarily a percentage
of a licensee's total revenue, or a flat amount, and did not directly depend
on the amount or type of music used. Until the litigation, plaintiff CBS held
a blanket license from each organization. CBS sued defendants ASCAP and
BMI, contending that the antitrust laws required these organizations to make
all of their compositions available at standard per-use rates within negotiated
categories of use. If such standard per-use rates were themselves found to
be violative of the antitrust laws, CBS argued in the alternative, an injunction
should issue forbidding the defendants to issue any blanket license or to
negotiate any fee except on behalf of an individual member for the use of
that member's own copyrighted work or works. Plaintiff's theory rested on
its characterization of the blanket licenses as a per se unlawful conspiracy
among composers to fix prices for copyrighted works.
The Court rejected CBS's contention that the blanket license was per se
invalid:
In the first place, the line of commerce allegedly being restrained, the
performing rights to copyrighted music, exists at all only because of the
copyright laws. Those who would use copyrighted music in public per-
formances must secure consent from the copyright owner or be liable...
for . . . damages .... Although the copyright laws confer no rights on
copyright owners to fix prices among themselves or otherwise to violate
the antitrust laws, we would not expect that any market arrangements
reasonably necessary to effectuate the rights that are granted would be
deemed a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Otherwise, the commerce
anticipated by the Copyright Act and protected against restraint by the
Sherman Act would not exist at all or would exist only as a pale reminder
of what Congress envisioned.10
The Court went on to explain why the blanket license might be "reasonably
necessary to effectuate the rights granted" by the Copyright Act:
The blanket license, as we see it, is not a "naked restrain[t] of trade with
no purpose except stifling of competition," but rather accompanies the
integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized
copyright use .... Most users want unplanned, rapid, and indemnified
access to any and all of the repertory of compositions, and the owners
want a reliable method of collecting for the use of their copyrights ....
70. Id. at 18-19.
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A middleman with a blanket license was an obvious necessity if the
thousands of individual negotiations, a virtual impossibility, were to be
avoided .... [The] substantial lowering of costs, which is of course
potentially beneficial to both sellers and buyers, differentiates the blanket
license from individual use licenses. The blanket license is composed of
the individual compositions plus the agregating service. Here, the whole
is truly greater than the sum of its parts; it is, to some extent, a different
product . . . .ASCAP [and BMI], in short, made a market in which
individual composers are inherently unable to compete fully effectively.,,
Finally, the Court concluded that where an arrangement such as the blanket
license may be pro-competitive, courts should apply a "rule of reason" and
weigh the arrangement's value against its anti-competitive effects:
7 2
[O]ver the years, and in the face of available alternatives, the blanket
license has provided an acceptable mechanism for at least a large part of
the market for the performing rights to copyrighted musical compositions,
[so that] we cannot agree that it should automatically be declared illegal
in all of its many manifestations. Rather, when attacked, it should be
subjected to a more discriminating examination under the rule of reason.
It may not ultimately survive that attack, but that is not the issue before
us today . . .
On remand the Court of Appeals held that the blanket license survived
rule of reason scrutiny. The Second Circuit noted that the ASCAP and BMI
contracts with the composers were not exclusive and placed the burden on
plaintiff CBS to prove that the blanket license prevented CBS from bypassing
ASCAP and BMI and negotiating for the desired individual composition
licenses either directly with the composers or with some other middleman.
The court quite narrowly held that because alternative licenses were "feasi-
ble," CBS had "failed to prove that the existence of the blanket license had
restrained competition. Since the blanket license is not a per se unlawful
arrangement, its restraining effect must be proved before § I [Sherman
Act] liability can be found . . . . [T]he challenge to the blanket license is
properly dismissed."4
The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit disposed of the case without
explaining why the music clearinghouses should be permitted to offer only
blanket licenses. This is quite surprising because that issue seemed to be the
crux of the case. Why did neither court grant CBS's request and order
ASCAP and BMI to negotiate fees for the use of each individual composer's
copyrighted works? The Supreme Court avoided the issue because it could
dispose of the per se rule and, therefore, the case by finding that "[a]
71. Id. at 20-23 (citations omitted).
72. "[T]he inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is
one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition." National Soc'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (invalidating Society's ban on com-
petitive bidding).
73. 441 U.S. at 24.
74. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970
(1981).
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middleman with a blanket license was an obvious necessity if the thousands
of individual negotiations, a virtual impossibility, were to be avoided. 75
This explains the middleman. Nothing in the opinion explains why a mid-
dleman, once established, could not negotiate on behalf of individual com-
posers if the licensee were willing to pay the costs of individual negotiation.
Apparently CBS was willing to pay that cost. The Second Circuit sidestepped
the issue, ironically holding that CBS could demonstrate no restraint of trade
because the network failed to prove that it was not feasible for it to engage
in individual negotiations either directly with the composers or with middle-
men independent of ASCAP or BMI. At one point in the opinion, the court
speculated as to why CBS, given these alternatives, brought the lawsuit.7 6
Why indeed?
One answer is that CBS wanted to avoid the blanket license because that
license is a sophisticated form of price discrimination that captured from
CBS some or all of its consumer surplus. To illustrate, assume all compo-
sitions are equally valuable and that a music clearinghouse with market
power, ASCAP for example, sold a license for each musical composition
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Illustration 14
75. 441 U.S. at 20.
76. 620 F.2d at 936-37.
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Absent the ability to price discriminate, the market would clear at P.,
Qo." Licensees would capture the value in triangle I. This is consumer
surplus. Now assume that ASCAP knows how much each licensee would
pay for compositions. ASCAP would simply charge for each unit what each
unit is worth to each licensee. The market would be as described by
Illustration 15:
Illustration 15
The market would clear at Q. There would be no set price. Each license
would sell at a different price. This is an efficient outcome from society's
standpoint. The marginal cost of supplying music for performance is ap-
proximately zero; once a song is written, it is virtually costless to supply.
Thus, it is a better allocation of resources for the composers to license
Q, songs rather than the Q. songs licensed in Illustration 14.78 The efficient
77. The marginal cost of producing musical compositions for performance is approximately
zero. Most of the actual cost is fixed in composing.
78. The quantity of composition for the market including many purchasers will, of course,
include multiple licensings of the same song.
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allocation in Illustration 15 is possible because price discrimination enables
the composer to capture the licensees' consumer surplus-represented by
triangle I-which compensates the composers for their fixed investment in
writing the songs.
The blanket license comes into play because, as seen in Illustration 14,
the demand curve is made up of many fewer consumers than licenses. For
example, CBS will demand many songs. Indeed, before the price reaches
zero-the marginal cost of supplying each song79 -CBS will demand each
song in ASCAP's repertory; it is always of some value to have the oppor-
tunity immediately to use any given song. How, then, does ASCAP sell




79. See supra note 77.
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Based on CBS's revenues, ASCAP knows approximately how much CBS
values each song and each additional song. Because marginal cost is zero,
ASCAP wishes to license its entire repertory. What are ASCAP's options?
It could calculate an average price per song for CBS, and license songs to
the network at that price, Pa in the illustration. At that price, however,
ASCAP would license only Qa songs. ASCAP, therefore, offers only a
blanket license. CBS must license the entire repertory at a price of Pa per
unit, or it may license no song. The blanket license allows ASCAP to supply
the optimal number of licenses and, constrained only by the cost of direct
composer licensing, to capture CBS's consumer surplus.
Thus, as unfortunate as it may be for CBS and other licensees, the blanket
license is efficient-it increases output until demand equals marginal cost,
that here is zero-and should not be invalid under the antitrust laws. If
the Second Circuit had thoroughly analyzed the blanket license, weighing
pro-competitive versus anti-competitive effects, the court would have been
on more solid economic ground when it approved the license. s0
B. Broadcast Music and Patented Products
Under the rule of reason Broadcast Music has at least two implications
for the antitrust laws. The first is general. Judge Frank Easterbrook, who
as Deputy Solicitor General successfully argued Broadcast Music before the
Supreme Court, has used the case to support the proposition that even
horizontal restraints "may contribute to the success of a cooperative venture
that promises greater productivity and output.''S As a result, all restraints
on trade should be examined carefully to determine whether even traditionally
prohibited conduct is in fact likely to be anti-competitive. This appears to
be the trend of recent Supreme Court authority. In Northwest Wholesale
Stationers v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 2 the Court recognized the
possible pro-competitive efficacy of group boycotts.8 3 In Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,84 the Court noted the pro-competitive
effects of low prices in its dismissal of a claim alleging predation. The
80. Of course, if the Second Circuit had truly found that CBS could bypass ASCAP and
BMI and as cheaply go to alternative sources, then the foregoing price discrimination analysis
would fail. One would then wonder why CBS brought the lawsuit. (ASCAP's explanation, 620
F.2d at 936-37, is unpersuasive). In any case, the Second Circuit held only that CBS did not
carry the burden of proving that alternative sources were not "feasible."
81. Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (covenant not to compete
between appliance dealer and building products dealer held ancillary to lease agreement and
thus subject to rule of reason test).
82. 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
83. The Court held that a group boycott does not warrant a conclusion that the boycott is
anticompetitive unless the boycotting cooperative possesses market power or has exclusive access
to an element essential to competition. Thus, a rule of reason analysis should apply.
84. 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
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possibility of successful predation was too remote to risk an antitrust inquiry
that might chill price competition.
These recent cases represent a promising trend, but they do not spell total
relief from the burden that illogical antitrust jurisprudence places on business.
In another recent case, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 85
the Court upheld a decision imposing liability on a ski resort operator because
it ended a joint venture with its direct competitor." Can one find in Broadcast
Music a rule more specific than a rule of reason inquiry, yet applicable to
virtually all patent licensing cases? The answer is yes.
The most important implication of Broadcast Music for patent cases arises
from the language that describes "the line of commerce allegedly being
restrained, the performing rights to copyrighted music, [as one that] exists
at all only because of the copyright laws." '87 As noted, the Court went on
to say that
we would not expect that any market arrangements reasonably necessary
to effectuate the rights that are granted would be deemed a per se violation
of the Sherman Act. Otherwise the commerce anticipated by the Copyright
Act and protected against restraint by the Sherman Act would not exist
at all or would exist only as a pale reminder of what Congress envisioned."
This language carves out special treatment under the antitrust laws for
congressionally granted exclusive rights. To be shielded or partially shielded
from the antitrust laws, a restraint used to exploit a patent need not be
absolutely necessary to exploit the patent. The emphasized language in the
quote above makes sense. No marketing technique is truly necessary. The
point is that severe restriction on marketing may turn a potentially profitable
endeavor into an unprofitable one. The Court was instructing lower courts
to take a second, hard look before allowing the antitrust laws to bite, because
activity analogous to monopoly exploitation techniques are important pro-
duction-enhancing elements in the fragile process of creating intellectual
property-a process that Congress has specially sanctioned. 9 The earlier
decisions that we have looked at take too narrow a view of permissible
85. 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985).
86. The Court found a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act in the refusal of a major ski
resort operator to continue offering interchangeable ski-lift tickets in conjunction with a smaller
competitor.
87. 441 U.S. at 18.
88. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
89. The fragile nature of desirable economic activity has led the Supreme Court to apply
less than strict scrutiny under the antitrust laws even in fields outside of those that Congress
has specially sanctioned. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984), where the
Court applied a rule of reason analysis to a broadcasting plan involving horizontal price-fixing,
a practice previously deemed a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 2960-61. But note
the unfavorable outcome for the defendants anyway. The result reinforces the idea that patents
and copyrights are special.
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patent exploitation. They are, therefore, inconsistent with Broadcast Music
and are of questionable validity. 9°
This proposition is not merely abstract. Broadcast Music squarely addresses
the issues we have seen in patent/antitrust law. The case includes a horizontal
combination, price-fixing, and the tying together of products, each designed
to exploit existing intellectual property rights. Instead of condemning these
practices as it had done in the past, the Court decided to allow the practices
if they were reasonable. There are no inefficient consequences in a patentee's
attempt to license a patent through a complex financing arrangement not
directly linked to the patent's use. Broadcast Music would, therefore, require
a different result in Brulotte and in Zenith.91 Additionally, tie-ins to patented
products have legitimate purposes and are so unlikely to be anti-competitive
that they do not require antitrust scrutiny.9 2 The same can be said of patent
licenses that include vertical price restraints. 93 Broadcast Music would, there-
fore, require different results in International Salt, Bauer, and Masonite,
regardless of the state of the law on tie-ins and vertical restraint for products
that do not include congressionally granted rights of exploitation. Finally,
the cross-licensing of blocking or complementary patents, even between
competitors, will not necessarily be anti-competitive. Broadcast Music, then,
though not directly addressing this particular issue, logically would require
a different result in Line Material.94
The logical result of Broadcast Music is not, however, per se validity for
all patent licenses. It remains an open question whether or when a patentee's
licensing of a patent to a competitor, or the cross-licensing of competitive
patents, is, on balance, anticompetitive. The economic losses that these
practices create may outweigh the economic benefits derived from the incen-
tive to create; recall our discussion of Standard Oil.95 Horizontal licensing
may be anti-competitive for one or both of two distinct reasons. First,
horizontal licensing may serve as a screen for a cartel. Second, such licensing
might substantially concentrate technological advantages in a single economic
unit.
1. Cartelization
A patent grants to a patentee economic rents that are in some aspects
similar to revenues that monopolies achieve through a cartel. In an article
90. The lower courts have been slow to credit the significance of the "reasonably necessary
to effectuate [a congressional purpose]" language. Compare United States v. Studiengesellschaft
Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (suggesting that tying practices may still
be illegal after Broadcast Music) with Instructional System Dev. Corp. v. Aetna, 787 F.2d
1395 (10th Cir. 1986) (paying lip service to language of Broadcast Music, then ignoring it).
[The opinion published in the advance sheet at this citation was withdrawn from the bound
volume because rehearing is pending. The opinion is reprinted in Trade Cas. 67,019 (CCH
1986).]
91. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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on cartels and license arrangements, George Priest describes the resulting
problem:
A cartel achieves returns by restricting output, and thereby setting price
above cost, the same way the owner of a patent achieves returns from an
invention. This indicates the difficulty of determining whether an arrange-
ment of patent licenses embracing all or most of the firms in a given
industry serves to exploit the value of a dominant patent or to disguise a
cartel agreement .... [A] group of firms agreeing, in violation of the
Sherman Act, either to fix prices or to allocate output, could disguise its
agreement by obtaining a patent on an unimportant process and executing
licenses to previously competing members which incorporate the provisions
of the illegal agreement."
The Standard Oil case is useful to illustrate a cartel disguised as a patent
licensing arrangement. 97 The analysis in Part I assumed, as did the Court,
that the defendants pooled valuable "cracking" patents and discussed the
possible pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of cross-licensing. Now
assume instead that the patents were worthless, that they were either invalid
or they provided no technological advantage over the cracking patent proc-
esses available in the public domain. Assume further that cracking was
superior to distillation and that, as a result, virtually all gasoline was
cracked. 9a Absent cartelization the market might be as described by
Illustration 17:
96. Priest, supra note 36, at 309.
97. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
98. This assumption appears to be correct. Priest points out that cracking produced ninety-






The market would clear at P,, Q,. Now assume that producers combine
a large proportion of production, charging one another and sublicensees
royalties on the worthless patents. Those royalties would raise the price of
gasoline in the market. The price increase ostensibly would be a result of
the increased cost attributable to the royalty payments. But the cartel recip-
ients themselves would receive these payments, making the royalty cost merely
a paper one. The cartel would set royalty prices so that the cartel as a whole
could maximize profits. The market would be as described by Illustration 18:
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Illustration 18
The market would clear at P,, Q. There would be a per unit royalty of
P,-Po. This arrangement is clearly anti-competitive because P, is greater
than P0 and Q' is less than Q). The cross-licensing creates no legitimate
incentives to innovate because, by hypothesis, the case involves no innova-
tion.
This anti-competitive result can occur even where a patentee licenses a
non-worthless patent. A patentee might license a valid patent under condi-
tions that restrain trade in excess of the restraint inherent in patent exploi-
tation. To illustrate, assume a patentee has developed a method to produce
a small quantity of engines at a few highly efficient plants at a cost below
the cost of production for existing technology. The market for engines might
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Illustration 19
Absent cartelization, the market would clear at P., Q.. The patentee
could receive royalties equal to the area in triangle I. The patentee's agree-
ment with the licensees who otherwise would be competitors might, however,
include minimum price or allocation provisions which would restrict output
and raise price to P,, Q. Thus, the licensees and patentee would earn
monopoly profit; profit in excess of the legitimate rents in triangle I. This
is possible because the license agreements have created extra rents-monopoly
profit. This monopoly profit equals the area in rectangle II and is not
attributable to innovation, but to naked collusion; there is a bigger pie in
which each member of the cartel may share. Alternatively, the cartel can
accomplish the same result by allowing the patentee to charge royalties equal
to the combined area in triangle I and rectangle II, provided that the patentee
somehow rebates a portion of those royalties.
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Priest suggests that the courts screen for these disguised collusive arrange-
ments by examining the allocation of profit that a patent license arrangement
creates. Priest would presume unlawful any arrangement that provides rents
for licensees as well as for the patentee. If the arrangement simply exploits
the patent, one would expect the patentee to receive all rents. Evidence of
shared profits include, inter alia: low royalties (indicating no valuable patent);
rebates (indicating royalties serving as minimum price restraints); and a post-
innovation increase in market price of a product. This latter indicator is a
good one because, using Illustration 19 for an example, nothing but collusion
would explain how innovation could increase price from P, to P,.99
2. Concentration of Technology
As good as Priest's analysis is, it does not deal with the more difficult
issue of determining whether license arrangements violate the antitrust laws
when those arrangements do nothing more than exploit patented technology's
advantage over unpatented technology. This question is interesting even if
the patentees' sole purpose in combining is to achieve economic rents by
restricting output and raising price. 10
Again, Standard Oil is illustrative. Assume that all cracking patents are
valid and that the market looks as it did in Illustration 10 as described by
Illustration 20:
99. Price, however, is not always determinative. If demand were increasing, price might rise
without collusion. For this and other more detailed analyses, see Priest, supra note 36. Priest
works his theory through a number of cases and engages in a more sophisticated analysis than
is present in the text.
Priest's screening theory is similar to Ward Bowman's patent superiority test. Bowman
would presume that an arrangement is unlawful if the arrangement creates monopoly profits
in excess of those made possible by a patent's superiority over alternative technology. W.
BowMAN, supra note 19, at 54, 63.
100. There are other, less "invidious" purposes for pooling or cross-licensing competitive
patents. There are, for example, possible benefits from the grant of immunity from patent
infringement suits, possible benefits from efficiency in resolving legal conflicts, and possible
benefits from creating an efficient way of licensing a large number of patents. See Andewelt,
Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 614-17 (1985);
Priest, supra note 36, at 358-64. The discussion in the text is designed to illustrate advantages
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Illustration 20
If the competing cracking patents did not combine, the market would clear
at P0, Q0. If the patentees combine the patents and fix the price at P
through a royalty agreement, then the market would produce only Q,
gallons, Q, of which distilling would supply.
As we noted in Part 1,101 such combination is not necessarily anticom-
petitive. If the law forbade this combination, an inventor might not begin
the search for an innovative process for fear that someone else would
simultaneously invent a similar process that would be competitive, thus
eliminating any return on investment in innovation.1,2 If this were to occur,
cracking technology would be slow to develop, and the economy would face
101. But see supra note 54.
102. See K. ARRow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources in Invention, in
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 153 (1971); R. POSNER, EcONOmiC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 32-33 (1982).
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a market for gas that cleared at P,, Q,, the least efficient position in
Illustration 20. This is not to say that all cross-licensing of competitive patents
should be allowed. Disallowing combination will eliminate only a component
of incentive, not all incentive. Some, perhaps much, innovation will occur
whether or not combination is lawful, because some inventors will predict
their inventions will be first and/or best. Moreover, allowing some but not
all combination will create added incentive as compared to a no-combination
rule, but will decrease dead weight loss as compared to a free combination
rule. The problem, a familiar one, is in striking the balance. 03
The law often allows mergers between firms in an industry. This is so
despite the ability of merged firms under common ownership and control to
103. Priest downplays the disincentive of prohibiting competitive patent combination relative to
the inefficiency created thereby. He states:
Where two firms have invested separately and have simultaneously achieved an
identical result, it is plausible that choosing one as superior to the other increases
uncertainty and reduces returns to invention. But where one firm has developed a
successful process and a second firm, conscious of the success of the first, has
reproduced it, uncertainty because of determining priority is absent. More important,
two firms investing separately to produce the identical process incur twice the costs
of a firm investing alone. Where each firm has invested simultaneously, unaware
of the other, this redundancy is explicable and perhaps justifiable. But where a
firm has already achieved success, the investment by a second firm solely to
reproduce the process in a different form, duplicates the investment of the first and
diminishes social welfare.
In the context of a patent, society only benefits from this duplicate expenditure
if it causes a fall in the price of the patented good and a reduction in the dead
weight loss and monopoly rent. If the two firms are allowed to cross-license their
patents and fix royalty, price, or output, this benefit will not be realized. The
redundant investment of the second firm is a clear loss . . . . A cross-license in this
context unambiguously dimishes welfare.
Priest, supra note 36, at 361-62.
This analysis is somewhat overstated. If the second patentee merely copies the first patent (and
somehow gets past the patent office and infringement suits), then there will be little welfare
loss because the second patentee will expend few resources. If the second patent attempts a
new process that is truly different from the first patentee's, but designed simply to duplicate
the first patent's effect, then either the second patentee is a fool or the patent laws offer too
much incentive, disregarding any possibility of ex post combination. Neither case is likely to
raise serious antitrust problems. Ex ante, the second patentee does not know that he will be
able to discover a different process equivalent to the first patentee's. He does know, however,
that even if he succeeds, he will have to share the returns on his innovation with the first
patentee, about whom the second patentee knows from the start. Thus, the second patentee
begins his innovative process with a lower expected return than the first patentee faced at the
same stage of innovation; the first patentee could at least hope that his invention would be
exclusive.
In addition, there may be advantages to having two processes that accomplish the same end.
The processes, for example, may utilize different inputs that could vary in relative cost over
time, and, as Edmund Kitch argues, a cross-license agreement between the inventor and the
duplicator will reduce socially wasteful investment because the two parties after the agreement
will pursue development of patents most efficiently. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcON. 265, 279 (1977).
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end by fiat price competition between them. Mergers are permissible because
they can have a positive effect on efficiency, either by enabling the exploi-
tation of economies of scale, or by enabling assets to be shifted to the hands
of more efficient managers.1°4 There is, however, no per se rule permitting
mergers. Under such a rule firms would have an incentive to merge in order
to engage in monopoly pricing. Not only would there be much monopoly
as a result, but the costs of production might be higher. Firms would
sometimes merge into units larger than efficient scale for the industry, for
they would be willing to incur diseconomies of large scale production so
long as the diseconomies were offset by monopoly profits. 05
The antitrust laws balance the effects of mergers. Mergers are permitted
so long as they are not between companies so large, relative to the market,
that one would presume the monopoly effects of the merger would outweigh
the efficiency effects. 106 The rules that regulate mergers are necessarily inex-
act, broad balances. As Judges Posner and Easterbrook point out in their
antitrust text, "a rule that will distinguish a merger designed to increase
efficiency from a merger designed to enable monopoly pricing is difficult to
design . . .a merger may do both.' '0 7
There are similar difficulties in designing rules to regulate the cross-
licensing of competitive patents. Like mergers, cross-licensing creates the
potential for economic rents and accompanying dead weight loss. And like
mergers, cross-licensing may create efficiencies. In the case of merger, the
efficiencies are simultaneous with the merger. In the case of cross-licensing,
the efficiencies are inter-generational; the cross-license today provides incen-
tives for innovation tomorrow. Just as we regulate mergers, we should
regulate competitive patent cross-licensing by drawing a line reasoned to, on
average, separate pro- from anti-competitive arrangements.
The Justice Department, the public body responsible for enforcing the
antitrust laws, uses guidelines to draw a distinction between lawful and
unlawful mergers. These guidelines may serve as a basis for judicial as well
as executive review. Part III of this article discusses the Justice Department's
current guidelines on horizontal mergers; it notes that these guidelines may,
under certain circumstances, not be appropriately tailored to cross-licensing
cases and suggests an alternative approach.
III. MODIFYING THE HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX TO ACCOUNT FOR
CONCENTRATION IN TECHNOLOGY
In deciding whether to challenge a proposed merger as anti-competitive,
the Justice Department uses market share and number of competitors as
104. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 19, at 393.
105. Id. at 393-94.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (Sherman Act not
violated by U.S. Steel's acquisition of Consolidated Steel Corporation).
107. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 19, at 394.
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proxies for a putative monopolist's market power. As we will see shortly,
the Department weighs these factors and sets benchmarks that separate
presumptively lawful from presumptively unlawful mergers. Courts could
conduct the same analysis.
Perhaps the cross-licensing of competitive patents should be subject to
scrutiny in accordance with existing Department guidelines for horizontal
mergers. Assume, for example, that two patentees cross-licensed competing
patents for the production of an automobile engine. If each patent accounted
for the production in a firm in a market that consisted of four manufacturers,
each with twenty-five percent of the market, then perhaps the Department
and the courts should treat the cross-licensing as a merger between these
two firms that together control fifty percent of the market.
Treating a cross-licensing as a merger makes sense if the patentee-
firms that cross-license lose their incentive to compete after cross-licensing.
This merging of interest occurs directly if the cross-licensing includes profit-
sharing among patentees and/or their licensees and may occur indirectly-
if increasing output subject to royalties benefits the competition too-
even without such profit-sharing. With or without explicit profit-sharing, the
cross-licensees may have an incentive to exploit their combined power by
reducing output and raising prices; the cross-licensing arrangement provides
the facility to do so. Thus, it may well make sense to treat them as merged
firms within a market subject to the same cross-licensing agreement. This does
not mean, however, that we should use existing merger guidelines to scrutinize
cross-licensing.
The current, 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines are designed
to deal with typical or average mergers; cross-licensing systematically could
differ from the typical merger. The Guidelines for horizontal mergers begin
with an explanation of concentration and market share that is useful here:
Market concentration is a function of the number of firms in a market
and their respective market shares. Other things being equal, concentration
affects the likelihood that one firm, or a small group of firms, could
successfully exercise market power. The smaller the percentage of total
supply that a firm controls, the more severely it must restrict its own
output in order to produce a given price increase, and the less likely it is
that an output restriction will be profitable. If collective action is necessary,
an additional constraint applies. As the number of firms necessary to
control a given percentage of total supply increases, the difficulties and
cost of reaching that supply also increase.
As an aid to the interpretation of market data, the Department will use
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") of market concentration. The
HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares
of all firms included in the market .... log
108. Department of Justice Merger § 3.1, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,830 (June 29, 1984)
(footnote 13 omitted). At this point, footnote 14 continues:
For example, a market consisting of four firms with market shares of 30 percent,
30 percent, 20 percent and 20 percent has an HHI of 2600 (302 + 302 + 202 +
[Vol. 35:825
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[T]he HHI reflects both the distribution of the market shares of the
top firms and the composition of the market outside the top firms.
It also gives proportionately greater weight to the market shares of the
larger firms, which probably accords with their relative importance in any
collusive interaction. The Department divides the spectrum of the market
concentration as measured by the HHI into three regions that can be
broadly characterized as unconcentrated (HHI below 1000), moderately con-
centrated (HHI between 1000 and 1800) and highly concentrated (HHI above
1800). An empirical study by the Department of the size dispersions of the
firms within markets indicates that the critical HHI thresholds at 1000 and
1800 correspond roughly to four-firm concentrations ratios of 50 and 70
percent, respectively. Although the resulting regions provide a useful format
for merger analysis, the numerical divisions suggest greater precision than is
possible with the available economic tools and information. Other things
being equal, cases falling just above and just below a threshold present
comparable competitive concerns .... ,o
20 = 2600). The HHI ranges from 10,000 (in the case of a pure monopoly) to a
number approaching zero (in the case of an atomistic market). Although it is
desirable to include all firms in the calculation, lack of information about small
fringe firms is not critical because such firms do not affect the HHI significantly.
Id. at 26,831 n.14.
109. Id. at 26,831. The Department goes on to explain its general standards for applying
HHI:
(a) Post-Merger HHI Below 1000. Markets in this region generally would be
considered to be unconcentrated [having the equivalent of at least ten equally sized
firms]. Because implicit coordination among firms is likely to be difficult and
because the prohibitions of section I of the Sherman Act are usually an adequate
response to any explicit collusion that might occur, the Department will not challenge
mergers falling in this region, except in extraordinary circumstances.
(b) Post-Merger HHI Between 1000 and 1800. Because this region extends from
the point at which the competitive concerns associated with concentration become
significant to the point at which they become quite serious, generalization is
particularly difficult. The Department, however, is unlikely to challenge mergers
producing an increase in the HHI of less than 100 points. The Department is more
likely to challenge mergers in this region that produce an increase in the HHI of
more than 100 points, unless the Department concludes, on the basis of the post-
merger HHI, the increase in the HHI, and the presence or absence of the factors
discussed [elsewhere in the Guidelines] that the merger is not likely substantially
to lessen competition.
(c) Post-Merger HHIAbove 1800. Markets in this region generally are considered
to be highly concentrated [having the equivalent of no more than approximately
six equally sized firms]. Additional concentration resulting from mergers is a matter
of significant competitive concern [and the Department will resolve close questions
in favor of challenging the merger]. The Department is unlikely, however, to
challenge mergers producing an increase in the HHI of less than 50 points. The
Department is likely to challenge mergers in this region that produce an increase in
the HHI of more than 50 points, unless the Department concludes, on the basis of
the post-merger HHI, the increase in the HHI, and the presence or absence of the
factors discussed [elsewhere in the Guidelines] that the merger is not likely substan-
tially to lessen competition. However, if the increase in the HHI exceeds 100 and
the post-merger HHI substantially exceeds 1800, only in extraordinary cases will
such factors establish that the merger is not likely substantially to lessen competition.
Id. § 3.11, at 26,831.
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Neither the Department nor the courts should automatically use the De-
partment's current HHI benchmarks to analyze the effective merger of firms
pursuant to the combination of competitive patents where the patents are
for production processes that exist in an industry that uses patented as well
as unpatented technology. This becomes apparent when one examines the
assumptions that underlie the HHI.
The Guidelines first must make certain assumptions about market elasticity
of demand. The Guidelines state that "the smaller the percentage of total
supply that a firm controls, the more severely it must restrict its own output
in order to produce a given price increase, and the less likely it is that an
output restriction will be profitable."' 10 This, however, tells us only that low
HHI mergers are relatively less threatening to competition than are high
HHI mergers. In order to set HHI thresholds, the Department must have
gone beyond this theoretical presumption and used empirical data to make
judgments in absolute terms.
To illustrate, assume that the Department considered a potential merger
of four firms in an industry comprised of twenty firms of equal size. The
Guidelines tell us that the Department probably would not challenge such a
merger even if it increased the HHI from 500 to 800-a final HHI of 800
is within the Guidelines' virtual safe harbor."' In drafting guidelines that
permit such a merger, the Department must have assumed that the typical







110. Id. § 3.1, at 26,830.
111. Id. § 3.11, at 28,831.
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Given this supply curve as a basis for an industry in pre-merger equilibrium
at P., Q., the presence of a post-merger firm with a twenty percent share
is not likely to pose a threat to competition. With seventeen firms in the
industry, collusion is unlikely. And with sixteen competitors supplying eighty
percent of market output, the merged firm will be unable to cut back output
enough to affect price. Even assuming a vertical demand curve at Q0, the
merged firm's cutback will induce a price increase limited by the marginal
cost to the other firms of replacing the merged firm's reduction in output.
The shape of S at Q. indicates that a cutback necessarily limited by the size
of the merged firm, here twenty percent of the market, ordinarily could not
induce a significant increase in price that would remain approximately Po.
The short-term industry supply curve, S, is the horizontal summation of
each firm's marginal cost curve." 2 The flat portion of S at Q. indicates
that there are some firms either currently in the industry, or at the edge
of entry, that can produce additional output at only a small increase above
P0. Thus the merged firm's limited cutback could not significantly increase
price unless the merged firm represented all of the potential supply above
Qo at approximately P0.
This hypothetical merger, one that would likely go unchallenged under the
Guidelines, truly presents no threat to competition only when the industry
supply curve includes fringe firms that can offset a merged firm cutback in
output by increasing production at approximately the pre-merger equilibrium
price. Here is the first potential difference between the typical merger and
patent cross-licensing-the combination of competitive patents systematically
may violate this condition more often than will a typical merger. To illustrate,
consider the following individual subindustry marginal cost curves:
$$
MCMC ,
POP0 , ~ .. - -- -
(a) 0 (b)
Illustration 22
112. M. BREaNNA, THEORY OF EcON1oMC STATICS 182-99 (1965).
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An ordinary industry supply curve might include the marginal cost curves
of firms that describe Illustration 22(a) and firms that describe Illustration
22(b); not all firms in an industry share a common marginal cost function.
The "subindustries" described here reflect a hypothetical division between
firms and potential firms that easily can expand output at P0 and those that
cannot. A typical merger will no more likely involve a firm from one
subindustry than from the other. Thus, if there are many firms from each
that comprise a market in equilibrium at P., a merger of small firms prob-
ably will leave in the fringe a number of firms described by Illustration 22(a).
Such firms restrain the monopoly power of the merged firm because, for
small changes, these firms can increase output at a price of approximately
P0. This explains the flat portion of S at Q0 in Illustration 21. If, however,
the merged firms combined all firms in the industry described by Illustration
22(a), then the only firms remaining in the fringe would be firms described
by Illustration 22(b). As a result, the effective restraint in the industry supply
curve, based on the remaining post-merger competition, at least in the short
run, would be a steep portion comprised of firms described by Illustration
22(b).
The latter situation is one that may be common in competitive patent
combinations. In these cases, publicly licensed technological advantages serve
to differentiate more efficient from less efficient firms. Thus, collusion and
concentration of advantage become more likely than in the typical merger
case. to illustrate, recall that in our prior discussion of Standard Oil, we
posited the possibility that cracking patent technology allowed a horizontal
supply curve for quantities well in excess of the equilibrium quantity in a
market where production is mixed between distilling and cracking. "3 An
almost horizontal supply curve, even in the short run, is reasonably possible
if the cracking technology does not quickly exhaust the capacity of individual
firms; that is, cracking technology may be a highly efficient production
technique over a broad range of output. Each cracking firm's marginal cost
curve might look like the ones that make up Illustration 22(a). This could
represent an improvement in efficiency over distilling firms conforming to
Illustration 22(b).
A merger among firms randomly chosen in the gasoline industry, or to
state a common reason for mergers, a merger between firms that together
are more efficient than the separate firms, would likely leave some cracking
firms in the fringe, and the merged firm would likely have little monopoly
power. There is no reason to believe that post-merger efficiencies relative to
pre-merger are any more or less likely to benefit distilling firms as they are
to benefit cracking firms. If, however, as was the case in Standard Oil, the
merged firm is uninterested in relative efficiencies, but instead systematically
113. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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includes most of the cracking technology, which, at competitive equilibrium
is more efficient than distilling independent of the merger, then the fringe
firm supply curve will likely slope upward, reflecting the marginal cost curves
of the less efficient distilling firms. Illustration 22(b) represents this situation.
Therefore, the fringe firms would, for some level of output, offer little
restraint on the merged firm's ability to raise price.
Patented processes that could be competitive are valuable when combined
precisely because they are more efficient than existing technologies. The
profit is in monopolizing the most efficient production facilities. Patents
identify for the world efficient production techniques, and this allows po-
tential competitors easily to find one another and to join together. Thus,
the pattern of inelastic fringe supply may be a part of competitive patent
combinations. The Department HHI benchmarks do not assume combination
of the most efficient firms and may therefore, underestimate the threat to
competition that competitive patent combination poses.
The effect just described is to some extent a short-term effect. The
combination of the most efficient firms in an industry will give the merged
firm long-term power only if new firms cannot enter and join the fringe
firms at pre-merger levels of production and at a production price near the
pre-merger equilibrium. Assuming as we have that the patented production
processes do not completely replace prior technology, there may be few
barriers to entry for firms using the prior technology. Thus, in the long run
in a constant-cost industry, entry should somewhat erode a merged firm's
power. This erosion, however, will not be complete. Long-term supply curves
may be upward-sloping because each firm that would enter an industry
would be less efficient than the previous firm. Only a higher product price
will draw a less efficient firm. This is the case on the whole, even though
some less efficient firms will be able to change their attributes over time.
Moreover, in the case of competitive patent combination, it may be
common that little if any long-term erosion will occur until the expiration
of the patents involved. We would expect this lack of erosion if patented
processes compete with non-patented processes that constitute an exhausted
cost-increasing subindustry. Technologies become highly costly or exhausted
when individual user firms' cost curves shift upward with increased total
production. Given a fixed technological process, increasing industry-wide
demand for inputs gives rise to these cost shifts. As production inputs become
more and more scarce, each firm faces higher and higher input costs that
are driven up by total producer demand. At high levels of industry-wide
output, each firm in an industry can supply an extra unit of output only at
a price well above the price at which that firm could have produced if it
alone increased output within lower industry-wide production. Given these
conditions, industry cost increases with output regardless of the efficiency
of the constituent firms. Entry would not flatten the industry supply curve
until the perfection of new competing technologies that use different inputs.' 1 4
114. See M. BRENNAN, supra note 112.
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Industries at equilibrium with exhausted technologies are, therefore, ripe
for an innovation that would allow production using fewer or different
inputs. Innovation may replace prior technology, or innovation may replace
only a portion of production using prior technology that may be more
efficient than the innovation over certain ranges of output. Even in the latter
case, where innovation occurs in such an industry, an entity with an exclusive
right in the innovation will face relatively little restraint in the market
compared to a typical firm of similar size. Where there is an exclusive right
in the marginally most efficient technology, we would expect to see fringe
supply curves that rise sharply, reflecting the fringe's need to make greater
and greater use of depleted resources. Moreover, once established, the in-
novator's cutback in production will not shift the fringe supply curve down-
ward. By hypothesis, the innovator's process is valuable in part because it
does not rely on resources made scarce by competing technology. 1 '5 The
innovator's cutback, therefore, will not free up resources as would a cutback
by a putative monopolist participating in the exhausted technology.
In addition, where new technology has replaced old at high levels of
industry output, we would expect few firms prepared to enter quickly using
the old, apparently exhausted and, as a result, archaic technology. Thus, an
innovator's cutback that follows a period of competition among "modern"
technologies will, over some time, force each existing old-technology firm
to operate on a steep-sloped portion of its marginal cost curve.
In any case, the prospect of long-term erosion does not excuse short-term
monopoly. In the long run, we all die, and most monopolies abate; never-
theless, a short-term loss due to monopoly is real and properly subject to
antitrust law. 1 1 6
We see, then, that a merger that could effect an exclusive combination of
an innovative technological process may be systematically more likely than the
average merger to face only weak restrictions on its power to raise prices.
11 7
Even small declines in a technological monopolist's output can create price
increases that might go unchallenged under the Justice Department Guide-
lines. The Justice Department should, therefore, take account of this potential
difference between the average competitive patent cross-licensing or merger and
115. Of course, the innovator's initial entry into the market will slightly shift downward the
fringe's supply curve because fringe technology production will be less post-innovation than
pre-innovation.
116. The current guidelines suggest a two-year time period for considering monopoly effects.
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, supra note 108, § 3.3, at 26,832.
117. This conclusion does not contradict Roger Andewelt's conclusion that the market share of
fringe firms may underestimate the fringe's elasticity of supply. See Andewelt, supra note 100,
at 624-25. Andewelt's analysis proceeds from the assumption that the putative monopolist will
attempt to monopolize the sale of licenses in competing technologies. The analysis in the text
assumes such a monopoly and examines the effect on product markets.
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the average intra-industry merger. The result of assessing this difference, how-
ever, is ambigous.
The current Guidelines do go beyond HHI analysis and attempt to deal
with the problems of fringe supply elasticity. Section 3.43118 states that "the
Department is less likely to challenge a merger if small or fringe firms
currently are able to expand significantly their sales at incremental costs that
are approximately equal to their incremental costs experienced at current
levels of output." And section 3.211 9 notes that "recent or on-going changes
in the market [such as technological changes] may indicate that the current
market share of a particular firm either understates or overstates the firm's
future competitive significance."
These comments, however, are not necessarily useful in scrutinizing patent
cross-licensing. Sections 3.43 and 3.21 are consistent with the foregoing
analysis and observation that, all else being equal, competitive patent cross-
licensing may pose a greater threat to competition than does the typical merger.
But that analysis does not necessarily imply that such cross-licensing arrange-
ments should be subject to harsher treatment than the Department would
give to a typical merger of similar size in a similar market. While cross-
licensing may create more market power than will a typical merger,
this additional power may be beneficial. Remember, permitting any com-
petitive patent cross-licensing enhances incentive to innovate because the
cross-licensing allows some rents resulting from the ability to reduce output
and increase price. If the HHI benchmarks in the current Guidelines are
designed to prevent virtually all monopoly power from merger, then the
strictness of the Guidelines may be inappropriate for patent combinations.
With regard to these combinations, therefore, the Guidelines' possibly strict
HHI benchmarks may offset their possibly inapposite inherent assumptions
about the relationship between market share and market power.
Put another way, the Guidelines' HHI analysis may by design allow too
little economic power to provide useful incentive for patent cross-licensing,
but may at the same time allow patent cross-licensing to slip through the
cracks, thus restoring incentive. As a result, perhaps the Department should
use current HHI benchmarks to scrutinize patent cross-licensing without
regard to the special limitations of sections 3.43 and 3.21. Indeed, perhaps
current HHI benchmarks should be made more lenient with regard to patent
licensing. Whether either of these solutions is in fact appropriate would
depend on empirical analysis.
Examining and perhaps altering HHI benchmarks for competitive patent
cross-licensing cases are useful and necessary steps. But these steps are not
sufficient; the system itself must change. For the reasons discussed above,
and because patent strength may vary widely from case to case, no system
of HHI benchmarks that treats fringe supply as a function of fringe size
118. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, supra note 108, § 3.43, at 26,833.
119. Id. § 3.21, at 26,831.
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adequately can address competitive patent combination. A sensitive
guide would take into account the patents' advantage over competing tech-
nologies. If the Department wishes to fine-tune its scrutiny by considering
factors such as those mentioned in sections 3.43 and 3.21, it should offer
more guidance than these rather obscure sections offer. The Department
could offer more guidance by making explicit its fringe firm supply assump-
tions for various HHI results. The Department could accomplish this by
using the following equations, which, though still subject to certain as-
sumptions that may not be applicable, under certain circumstances, provide
a more accurate measure of market power than does HHI analysis:
- ed where ed = ed (mkt.) + es (1 -S)
ed-I S
Po/Pc is monopoly price divided by competitive price and is the measure
of an alleged monopolist's market power. The symbol ed is the elasticity of
demand facing the firm alleged to have market power; S is the firm's market
share; ed (mkt.) is the elasticity of demand that faces the market consisting
of the firm in question and its competitors; and el is the elasticity of supply
of the firm's competitors.'20
The elegance of these formulas is quickly apparent. Assume es=0; ed
would equal ed (mkt.)/S. This correctly indicates that the firm would face
constraint only from the market demand curve and the firm's relative size,
not from competition. Assume instead that firms merge in an atomized in-
dustry where el is approximately infinite; there, ed (mkt.) + es (I - S)/S
would approach infinity; ed/(ed - 1) would approach 1, which correctly in-
dicates no market power.' 1 In sum, these market power equations take ac-
count of a number of factors, each of which is necessary to predict market
power accurately. Market share alone is not sufficient.
The Department Guidelines employ HHI analysis instead of this market
power formula probably because it is difficult to measure ed (mkt.) and el.
HHI allows the Department to proceed after calculating only S for each
firm in an industry. But it would not be difficult for the Department to use
the market power equation in conjunction with its HHI analysis. The De-
partment easily could assume a series of market characteristics, including e 
d
(mkt.) and el, for any HHI result. Having done this, the Department could
issue new guidelines listing HHI results, the assumed ed (mkt.), el, S and
resulting in Po/Pc for each result, or at HHI increments. The new guidelines
could then issue benchmarks for scrutiny similar to those that exist in the
current Guidelines. These benchmarks could take into account the possible
120. For a further explanation of these equations, their underlying assumptions, and their




differences in benefit, discussed above, in a cross-licensing as compared to
a typical merger and would account for specific fringe supply elasticity.
At whatever levels set, the benchmarks would include a useful market
power quotient. Guidelines could, for example, indicate that a benchmark
post-merger HHI of 1000 corresponds to a market in which a merged firm
supplies ten percent of the market. Guidelines so structured would be an aid
to some competitive patentees who desire to merge or cross-license. Patentees
who could estimate their market power could also estimate the probability
that the combination would ultimately be deemed unlawful.
Of course, as noted, the problem with the market power equation in the
first place is its practical difficulty. the new guidelines would be useful in
several ways. First, these suggestions arise only after we assume that the
current Guidelines do not adequately address certain combinations; a dif-
ficult solution is better than none at all. 122 Second, the Department could
make these suggested guidelines substantially less difficult to use than the
market power equation itself. Recall that it is elasticity of fringe supply
that systematically may differ for patent combinations compared to the
average merger; nothing we have seen alters current guideline assumptions
about elasticity of market demand. Thus, the suggested guidelines could
include a constant ed (mkt.) that the Department, patentees, and the courts
could take as given. This could focus everyone's attention on a single
indicator: es.
If el is too difficult or too expensive to calculate, the Department could
establish a proxy for es based on the combined patentees' internal marginal
cost advantages of using the combined technology as compared to using
technology available to other firms. It should be easier to estimate individual
firm marginal cost than it would be to estimate industry supply. The formula
for calculating proxies would depend on empirically based assumptions, that
are, perhaps, difficult to determine. But once the proxies were in place,
though inexact, they would contribute to the advantage of certainty in the
law, which, after all, is a principal purpose of any guideline.
There is another reason the guidelines suggested here would not necessarily
be too expensive to use. Their use could be narrowly applied. Assume, for
example, as was true in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 23 that
patented production comprised ninety-four percent of all production in the
glass industry, and that all patents were cross-licensed among competitors
via a patent pool holding company. Such an arrangement would be subject
to challenge under a simple HHI analysis, even one geared to take account
of possible special incentive benefits of cross-licensing. It would be almost
impossible to show an es high enough to justify the combination. There
would, therefore, be no need to calculate el or a proxy therefor.
122. Courts currently engage in complex microeconomic analysis where necessary to reach a
correct result. See, e.g., MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983) (predatory pricing case).
123. 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
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There would, in addition, be no need to invoke the suggested guidelines
if a competitive patent combination did not threaten competition even among
possessors of similar technology. Where a combined concern has no power
even absent the restraint of an alternative technology, the existence of that
alternative technology becomes irrelevant. Once again, there would be no
need to calculate el or a proxy therefor; current HHI analysis can deter-
mine lack of concentration within a technology.' 24
The suggested guidelines would be important where monopolized patented
processes compete with, but do not replace, alternative marginally less
efficient technologies. This can occur whenever an innovation allows a
relatively flat production supply curve that intersects with a steeper alternative
technology supply curve-as seen in the discussion of Standard Oil. 125 Current
guidelines may not estimate accurately the anti-competitive effect when pat-
ented technologies combine in such markets. The guidelines suggested here
would allow more accurate estimation and would serve to permit some
combination, but not at any cost.
CONCLUSION
Many techniques that patentees employ to exploit their patents are con-
demned by antitrust law despite the fact that the techniques are, on balance,
beneficial to the economy. The Supreme Court's rule of reason analysis in
Broadcast Music has opened the door for courts to vindicate these wrongly
prohibited practices. Many practices should be exempt from scrutiny. Others,
most notably the horizontal combination of competitive patents, should be
subject to scrutiny.
The Justice Department and the courts should treat competitive patent
combinations much in the same way that the current Department Guidelines
treat horizontal mergers. The Department should, however, reexamine these
Guidelines in order to take into account the systematic reduction in elasticity
of fringe firm supply following a patent combination compared to that
following a typical merger, and the possible differences in the benefits to
cross-licensing as compared to benefits in the typical merger.
124. But see supra note 116.
125. See supra notes 49-54 and notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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